- xiv, 271 pages ; 23 cm.
- Contents: 1. The Great Recession, Regulatory Failure, and Global Governance -- 2. Global Financial Instability and the Evolution of Global Banking Regulation -- 2.1 Financial Stability and Banking Regulation -- 2.2 Evolution of the Basel Committee -- 3. A Theoretical Framework to Explain Influence in Global Banking Regulation: -- The Transnational Regulatory Regime -- 3.1 Influence in Global Banking Regulation -- 3.2 Competition State and Opportunity Structures of the Regulatory Regime -- 3.3 Global Governance and Opportunity Structures of the Transnational Regulatory -- Regime -- 4. Global Banking Regulation Before the Great Recession: The Global Dynamics -- of Basel II -- 4.1 An Approach to Assess Influence in the Global Political Economy -- 4.2 Basel II Policy Analysis -- 4.3 The Global Politics of the Basel II Process -- 4.4 Summary: Basel II, the Great Recession, and the Global Political Economy -- 5. Global Banking Regulation After the Great Recession: Basel III, FSB, G20 -- 5.1 New Policies: Basel III and Global Systemically Important Banks -- 5.2 New Layers in the Governance Structure and the Deepening Transnational -- Regulatory Regime: BCBS, FSB, G20 -- 6. Conclusion: Layers and Gaps in the Global Political Economy -- 6.1 Global Banking Regulation and Financial Stability -- 6.2 Global Financial Governance and Regulatory Reform: Diligent, but Feeble -- 6.3 Layers and Gaps in Governing the Global Political Economy.Includes bibliographical references and index.Summary: Does global governance contribute to regulatory failure and financial crises? And, if it does, should we enhance global cooperation to prevent future crises or confine our focus on the national level? Roman Goldbach reveals that, while global cooperation of bank regulators should minimise the emergence of financial crises, it actually contributes to the build-up of financial bubbles and the resulting turmoil. Underlying this regulatory failure is the transnational regulatory regime that globalises the governance structure and policy process of regulating banks. It entrenches asymmetric influence in a manner that raises the possibilities of national and transnational firms integrating their preferences into global regulatory standards, while at the same time decreasing the incentives for, and capacities of, politicians and regulators to protect the public good of systemic stability. Moreover, Goldbach argues that the underlying governance structure remains intact to date, which promises comparable future regulatory failure. The book provides both a theoretical framework of the global political economy of banking regulation and a detailed analysis of the policies and politics of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and its two most recent global standards- the Basel II and Basel III frameworks. Goldbach's innovative analysis, which integrates all actors and institutions of the global political economy and builds on new empirical material from national, transnational, and international processes, demonstrates how global governance has contributed to the onset of the "Great Recession" and how it continues to increase the likelihood of future global financial crises.